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Abstract 
  
Interest group influence is an understudied area, and influence in the regulatory arena is even less 
observed. Conclusions for influence on policy outcomes vary, from the view that federal agencies 
allow for a diversity of viewpoints, to observing that federal agencies disproportionately favour 
certain interests. This discrepancy is especially concerning in the United States, where business 
and financial interests are observed as being especially dominant, and responsiveness to organised 
interests is noted as highly important to bureaucrats. This study focuses on the extent to, and the 
mechanisms through which private interests influence a regulatory outcome in the case of anti-
money laundering. By analysing the comment papers submitted during the regulator’s 
deliberations over the final rule, I find that private interests dominated the input given and 
influenced the final rule. When the majority of commenters is unified in a central message, the 
final rule is likely to reflect those interests. My research contributes to the body of work that 
evaluates lobbying influence on federal agencies in the United States, and the mechanisms through 
which private interests convey influence.  
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Introduction 
 As legislation becomes increasingly complex in modern democracies, politicians often 
pass broad legislation and leave the technicalities to unelected bureaucrats. This dynamic is 
particularly pronounced in the United States (US), where federal agencies passed 28 laws on 
average for every law passed by Congress (Crews, 2018). Opportunities are created for stakeholder 
input, even long after the relevant legislation was passed by Congress. Federal agencies, as 
unelected bodies with no constitutionally vested power, are highly dependent on the feedback of 
their stakeholders to justify their rulemakings and maintain their legitimacy (Yackee, 2006). This 
dynamic creates a tension for bureaucrats, as they need to be seen as responsive and effective. 
Bureaucrats may behave strategically to improve how the agency is perceived, enhance its power, 
and prevent potential criticism or court challenge (Chubb, 1983; Hrebenar, 1997; Carpenter, 2014). 
Federal agencies are irrevocably tied to their stakeholders, making them highly susceptible to 
certain lobbying interests.  
 Mandating bureaucrats to consult relevant stakeholders in theory should provide for a 
plurality of voices, but in practice the process is more complicated. Ideally, interactions with 
stakeholders should create a useful dialogue that results in effective, stable policy (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 1993; Baumgartner et al., 2009). However, the wider literature on interest groups in the 
US indicates a dominance of business interests, creating an asymmetrical dialogue for agencies to 
respond (Olson, 1965; Lindblom, 1977; Baumgartner & Leech, 2001). The financial sector in 
particular is considered to be highly influential in the American system (Broz, 1999; Cerny, 1994; 
Streeck, 2014). The potential effects of business dominance are not well known. The literature 
only recently gave attention to the matter of influence, with such topics as mobilisation and access 
given greater attention throughout the 20th century (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Mahoney, 2007). 
Even less is written about the direct interactions between federal agencies and stakeholders, and 
when this literature is considered, business and financial dominance is no longer as clear. While 
earlier works indicate that a diversity of voices are heard, more recent works indicate the 
dominance of business interests (Golden, 1998; Nixon et al., 2002; Yackee, 2005; Yackee & 
Yackee, 2006). Missing from the discussion is an in-depth look into the mechanisms through 
which influence is exerted, and what impact the influence has on the content of regulation.  
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 When considering mechanisms to explain the dominance of business and financial interests 
in lobbying, the concept of unity is increasingly prevalent. Unity theorises that business will be 
able to overcome opposing groups, as business by its nature has greater resources to mobilise itself 
around a common goal (Smith, 2000). The effect is noted as particularly strong in the US, and in 
the financial sector (Hacker & Pierson, 2010; Young & Pagliari, 2015). While an increasing 
amount of the literature on interest groups continues to consider business unity in terms of how 
groups mobilise and articulate demands (Falkner, 2007; Roemer-Mahler, 2013, Young, 2012), 
little is written on the extent to which unity may influence policy outcomes. Given the strategic 
importance of bureaucrats to be responsive to their stakeholders, overrepresentation of business 
interests has the potential to result in ineffective regulations that reflect only certain interests at the 
expense of the wider public. 
This study will address the question:  
To what extent did financial interests influence federal regulation on banking secrecy 
in the United States?  
By answering this question, this research aims to contribute to the limited literature on the 
mechanisms of when and how unity matters for business influence. I hypothesise that financial 
and business interests will exhibit a significant degree of influence on the observed regulation, 
while civil societal and governmental interests will carry little to no influence. I also expect to find 
that the preferences expressed by financial interests will bear a striking unity to each other, and 
that business interests will largely resemble financial interests. I employ a preference attainment 
and process tracing framework to evaluate how much financial and business interests influenced a 
regulatory outcome, and the degree to which they were unified throughout the process. This 
method involved reading through the over 250 comment papers submitted in response to the 
proposed rulemaking, creating a catalogue of the most frequently mentioned positions, and 
arranging them into coding categories. I also assessed each stakeholder for whose interests they 
represent and sorted them into nine categories, six of which represent various financial interests. I 
then coded the positions of stakeholders according to whether they argued for more or less 
regulation.  
As anti-money laundering is increasingly a priority in the 21st century, the US is observed 
as sorely lacking in its domestic framework to combat banking secrecy (US Treasury Department, 
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2015; Transparency International, 2018). Anti-money laundering is a regulatory area in which the 
relevant federal agency has wide remit, as few major pieces of legislation have been passed, while 
the highly complex technical details have been left to multiple regulations devised by bureaucrats 
(Gouvin, 2003). I observed the degree of stakeholder influence over the regulatory process behind 
the 2016 final rule by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Customer Due Diligence 
Requirements for Financial Institutions. The regulation clarifies three existing expectations of the 
Bank Secrecy Act and Patriot Act, and adds one new requirement. Among the clarified 
expectations are existing expectations of customer identification and verification, developing risk 
profiles of customers, and monitoring of customer activities for suspicious transactions and 
regularly maintaining and updating profiles based on the results. The new expectation is to extend 
identification and verification to the beneficial owners of accounts. I analysed the full process of 
the rule, beginning with the 2010 guidelines for beneficial ownership information that preceded 
the proposed rulemaking, moving to the two notices of proposed rulemaking released in 2012 and 
2014, and ending with the final rule in 2016. I considered attempts at influence in the comment 
papers and assessed how unified these attempts were in the specific preferences expressed, the 
overall message sent, and the attainment of preferences. 
I will begin by providing an overview of the nature of federal agency lobbying and the 
significance of bureaucratic responsiveness and strategic behaviour, and how they are theorised to 
interact with business unity. I will then clarify the case selection and identify relevant stakeholders, 
before explaining how I coded the comment papers, calculated what degree of influence and 
preference attainment was achieved, and assessed a possible causal chain through process tracing. 
The analysis will present the structure of who participated, to what extent they managed to 
influence the final rule, and to what degree interests were united throughout the process. While I 
did find that financial and business interests influenced the final rule, while civil societal and 
governmental interests carried little influence, I found lower unity than I expected. Financial and 
business interests expressed fairly diverse preferences as to what the final rule should look like, 
but were unified in expressing that less regulation was needed because the ruling itself was too 
costly and unnecessary. I conclude that unity in specific issue preferences may not be as important 
as unity in the central message sent, which might be due to the legal requirements for 
responsiveness that cause agencies to be greatly concerned with their reputation. The increased 
salience of criticism in the form of legal challenge makes it highly important for bureaucrats to 
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respond to the central message sent by a majority of stakeholders, even if the input received is 
highly biased towards certain interests.  
Theoretical Foundations 
 There is ample literature that studies interest groups and how they interact with the 
government through lobbying. Lobbying is commonly accepted as the provision of information to 
decision-makers in order to convince them of one’s side of an issue and influence the ensuing rule 
(Nownes, 2006). However, throughout the 20th century, little attention was given in the scholarship 
to the actual interactions held between interest groups and their respective agencies, instead 
choosing to focus on other aspects of interest groups such as mobilisation and access (Baumgartner 
& Leech, 1998). More recently, scholars have turned their attention to these interactions, but 
influence is often avoided due to the difficulties in operationalisation and measurement (Mahoney, 
2007). As the scholarship moves away from a perspective that prioritises the rules of the game, 
towards one that focusses on the “extensive policy arrangements associated with modern 
governance”, a better understanding of influence is more important than ever (Hacker & Pierson, 
2014, p. 648). This study departs from the idea that influence after legislation has already been 
passed must be considered—namely, the strategic space occupied by federal agencies in 
rulemakings.  
Lobbying effects on public bureaucracies are increasingly studied as they become more 
important to policy-making in the US and other modern democracies. Rulemaking carries 
substantial influence, with legislation too vague to be implemented, leaving important legally-
binding choices to unelected bureaucrats (Kerwin & Furlong, 1992; Berry, 1989). Federal agencies 
are vested with powers to enact rules and the responsibilities to respond to stakeholders through 
the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) of 1946. The two main rules state that the agency must 
provide notice of a proposed rule in the Federal Register, and that the agency must both provide 
adequate opportunity to give input and consider the input given (APA § 553(b, c)). To ensure that 
bureaucrats make informed decisions, and are held accountable for them, “notice and comment”1 
proceedings are mandated for any rulemakings. These proceedings are important for two reasons: 
Firstly, they provide a textual record of the preferences of stakeholders, and how the regulator 
                                                 
1 Federal agencies issue details on the proposed rulemakings, providing notice for stakeholders to submit their input 
through comment papers by a certain date (Yackee, 2005).  
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responded to them (Chubb, 1983). Secondly, they are intended to enable equal opportunities for 
all stakeholders to provide input (Croley, 2000). This rule provides the legal basis for bureaucrats 
to be strategically responsive, as it explicitly requires acceptance and consideration of input from 
any interested parties. Hacker and Pierson (2014, p. 644-5) note the importance of policy in the 
idea of “policy as prize”, whereby actors invest substantial resources into attempting to influence 
policy in the hope of long-term advantages. Some scholars have even theorised that the process 
results in “regulatory capture”, in which regulatory agencies by their nature benefit and serve 
regulated industries (Bernstein, 1955; Lowi, 1969; Stigler, 1971; Carpenter, 2004). Potential 
influence on regulatory outcomes is important in both the short and the long term, as immediate 
impacts and overall trajectories of policy are shaped by those who provide input.  
The position of federal agencies is complicated by the multiple stakeholders and audiences 
that the agency must please in order to maintain rulemaking legitimacy without the concurrent 
constitutional or electoral authority. It is theorised that public agencies interact with interest groups 
in the interest of obtaining “policy goods”, resources for which the agency must depend on interest 
groups to supply (Braun, 2012). An often-cited prediction drawn from agency dependence on 
policy goods is that of resource dependence theory, whereby interactions are dictated by the 
agency’s need for survival and thus strategically determined by the relative importance of 
resources to an organisation and the concentration of these resources in the wider environment 
(Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978). It is this dynamic that encourages responsiveness, but at the same time 
fuels bureaucrats acting strategically. While bureaucrats would ideally behave in an entirely 
objective fashion during rulemakings, an increasing body of research points to them as strategic 
actors in their own right (Chubb, 1983; Balla, 1998; Yackee, 2006). The information and resources 
provided by interest groups are seen as particularly useful in reducing uncertainty about the 
consequences of legislation (Rourke, 1984; Hrebenar, 1997; Wright, 1996). Bureaucrats can then 
use this information to their own various strategic ends, whether it be to influence public opinion, 
avoid criticism, maintain control over their rulemakings, or disagree with the executive (Hrebenar, 
1997; Rourke, 1984; Wilson, 1989, Carpenter, 2014). Bureaucrats are strategic actors in their own 
right, and the incentives presented to them in rulemakings must be considered.  
The interactions between federal agencies and interest groups are further complicated by 
the potential effects of judicial involvement. The goals of the APA to increase transparency, 
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accessibility and accountability in the rulemakings of agencies are the responsibility of the 
judiciary to uphold through the opportunity for judicial review (Croley, 2000). Most significantly, 
the textual record of the notice and comment proceedings provides a useful body of evidence to 
legally challenge new rules. Rules are automatically subject to judicial review to ensure that they 
are within the agency’s mandate and properly follow from the applicable legislation (Funk et al., 
1997). Bureaucrats have a significant incentive to show responsiveness to comments, as “failure 
to adequately acknowledge or respond to a comment is grounds for judicial appeal, and ultimately 
remand or even reversal” (Nixon et al., 2002, p. 65). The pressure to accept influence in order to 
avoid legal challenge is so great that William West even termed the dynamic the “judicialization” 
of rulemaking (West, 1984, p. 390). The threat of legal challenge adds salience to the strategic 
responsiveness of bureaucrats, as they are legally bound to be able to show that stakeholder input 
was incorporated into the rule. This dynamic creates a system of shared control, whereby agencies 
must be attentive to and are influenced by the Congress, President, public, and courts (Yackee, 
2006). However, when a majority of comments represent private interests, it begs the question of 
how the regulator can manage to be effective while also incorporating heavily biased input.  
 The common theme of the dominance of business interests in the literature on interest 
groups, especially in the context of the US, causes great concern for the dynamic presented in 
interactions between federal agencies and stakeholders. The traditional assumption is that business 
interests will dominate in influencing policy-making because they have significant advantages in 
the provision of information and have lower costs to mobilise than other groups (Olson, 1965; 
Kerwin, 2003). Other scholars also highlight the important role played by business in the economy, 
particularly when it comes to financial interests, as other businesses depend on financial services 
for their own activities (Lindblom, 1977; Broz, 1999; Cerny, 1994). This dominance is identified 
by scholars as particularly pronounced in the US (Baumgartner & Leech, 2001; Schlozman, 1984). 
The US sees less compromise and more cases where one side reaps absolute victories while the 
other suffers absolute losses, with the winners representing business interests the majority of the 
time and citizen groups often achieving none of their goals (Mahoney, 2007). This trend is 
particularly troubling in the case of rulemakings, as if bureaucrats are responsive to business 
interests, regulations will reflect the preferences of certain interests at the expense of the public 
interest.  
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 An increasingly prevalent explanation for the disproportionate influence of business 
interests is that of unity. James Wilson (1989) was one of the first scholars to note the importance 
of unity for interest groups, as he notes that since group preferences are similar, so too will be the 
costs and benefits, incentivising cooperation. The business unity theory predicts that business has 
the capacity to overcome the demands of opposing groups due to their superior ability to overcome 
collective action problems and remain unified (Smith, 2000). However, there remains debate as to 
what degree of consensus is required—whether specific preferences must be aligned, or whether 
a united message is enough. Some scholars highlight the dissent within the business community 
itself, claiming that between the dissent within the ranks, and dissenting voices of other groups, 
unity cannot be automatically assumed (Truman, 1951; Lowery & Gray, 2004). Yackee (2006, p. 
740) concluded both that agencies disproportionately favoured business interests, and that 
consensus in a central message is more important than the degree of consensus in the comments 
overall, directly contradicting the predictions of Wilson. However, a number of conditional factors 
have been identified that lessen business influence and unity, namely: high public salience, which 
increases the salience of the voice of the public; high Congressional or Presidential attention, 
which can cause policy-makers to turn a blind eye to interests not in-line with theirs and favour 
their supporters; or a high mobilisation of outside groups, which multiplies the voices, demands 
and pressures on policy-makers to be responsive and creates more possible coalitions around which 
to unify (Culpepper, 2011; McCubbins et al., 1987; Smith, 2000). Business unity is agreed as an 
important factor in influencing policy-makers, but uncertainty remains as to when and how unity 
matters. It is important that our understanding of unity as a vehicle for influence is developed in 
order to improve our ideas of how the strategic interests of bureaucrats and the resulting rule are 
influenced. 
When discussing business dominance and unity, scholars increasingly identify the financial 
sector as exhibiting greater unity and influence than other sectors. Again, the effect is identified as 
particularly salient in the US, where extreme inequality and a lack of compromise in policy-making 
emphasises the ample resources and high organisational capacity of finance (Hacker & Pierson, 
2010). The role of information is particularly salient in matters relating to financial regulatory 
decisions, as the complexity of the environment and seriousness of unintended consequences 
causes politicians to turn to the wisdom of stakeholders and experts (Pagliari & Young, 2012). 
However, some research since the financial crisis argued that financial lobbying has weakened, 
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mainly due to the greatly increased public salience of finance (Baker, 2010; Woll, 2013). Young 
and Pagliari (2015) evaluate overall business unity in regulatory politics, giving particular attention 
to the unique position held by finance, and find that the financial sector does attract higher levels 
of business unity than other sectors. However, Clapp and Helleier (2012) argue that high 
mobilisation of outsiders in lobbying can manage to outweigh the voice of finance, rather than 
supporting their interests. One explanation offered for this effect is the rise of finance capitalism, 
whereby the infrastructural role played by financial groups strongly situates them to influence 
other business groups and policy-makers (Streeck, 2014). Given the privileged position of finance 
and its potential for increased unity, there are significant opportunities to influence outcomes in 
the short and long term towards financial interests. 
Unlike the scholarship on interest groups more generally, which consistently highlights the 
advantages of business interests, consideration of notice and comment procedures has yielded 
more diverse results. Earlier works generally conclude that business interests are not favoured, 
supporting the assumption that notice and comment procedures provide an equal opportunity for 
input (Magat et al., 1986; Cropper et al., 1992; Golden, 1998; Nixon et al., 2002). However, more 
recent assessments of notice and comment proceedings mainly conclude that business interests are 
favoured, though without agreement on why or how. In analysing the influence of comment papers 
on federal agency rulemaking, the authors concluded that the submission of interest group 
comments does directly affect the content of federal agency rules, and that comment periods are 
likely to be dominated by business interests (Yackee, 2005; Yackee & Yackee, 2006). Heightened 
unity was observed by Young and Pagliari (2015), who found that financial sector regulation is 
associated with consistently higher levels of business unity than any other sectors, despite there 
being a diversity of interests present. Missing from the discussion is an in-depth look into the 
mechanisms through which business or finance carry influence. Many studies over-rely on process 
tracing to establish influence, or apply overly-simple measures of “success” that fail to adequately 
capture the dynamic (Kluver, 2011). Studies evaluating influence also often evaluate business 
influence more generally, rather than focussing on the unique dynamics within the financial sector. 
It is curious that more attention has not been given to the topic of financial regulation, as the 
evidence indicates that finance is an area particularly prone to be captured by the influence of 
special interests (Pagliari & Young, 2012). This study aims to fill the gap in our understanding of 
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interactions between federal agencies and their stakeholders, and how unity among stakeholders 
may influence bureaucrats to produce rules largely reflecting private interests.  
In this vein, I will investigate to what extent financial interests influenced federal regulation 
on banking secrecy in the United States. Given the literature indicating the dominance of private 
interests, I expect that financial and other business interests influenced the final ruling towards less 
regulation, largely through presenting a unified front in the notice and comment proceedings.  
H1: Financial and business interests will directly affect the content of the final rule.  
H2: Governmental and nongovernmental interests will not directly affect the content of the 
final rule.   
In observing the expressed preferences of stakeholders, the striking unity observed among business 
and especially financial interests leads me to expect that  
H1a: Financial interests will closely resemble each other. 
H1b: Business interests will closely resemble financial interests. 
Data and Method 
 I observed the degree of stakeholder influence over the regulatory process behind the 2016 
final rule by the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)2, Customer Due Diligence 
Requirements for Financial Institutions. I selected this regulation for a number of reasons: Firstly, 
it is a regulation for which FinCEN has complete legal autonomy. The initiative for the legislation 
originated within FinCEN itself, ensuring that I have not missed influence carried at the 
Congressional level. Secondly, customer due diligence legislation was long overdue, having been 
already implemented in other developed states, but the final rule still showed significant gaps for 
the flow of illegal money (Transparency International, 2016). Thirdly, this piece of legislation is 
one that is highly technical and exerted significant costs specific to financial institutions, while 
other businesses would remain unaffected. Thus, it is an area in which businesses should not be 
expected to unify their interests with those of finance (Young & Pagliari, 2015). Finally, on a 
scholarly level, the realm of tax and regulatory provisions, being a highly technical area with little 
                                                 
2 FinCEN is the wing of the US Treasury Department that is delegated the responsibility to issue regulations under 
the Bank Secrecy Act. 
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attention, is understudied as scholars choose to investigate the most controversial questions, such 
as abortion, civil rights, or gun control (Smith, 2010). The regulation is also a useful one in that it 
provides multiple time points for analysis. This is advantageous from both a scholarly and a 
methodological standpoint. The majority of the literature only looks at a single timepoint, and 
therefore does not capture any changes in dynamics during the process. In observing both influence 
and unity, I can observe the shift, or lack thereof, of the regulator towards more or less regulation, 
and I can observe what different coalitions among interest groups form at different stages in the 
rulemaking process.  
I used the following criteria to differentiate between financial, business, governmental, and 
nongovernmental interest groups: Financial interest groups are defined according to the covered 
institutions of the ruling. These groups include banks, brokers or dealers in securities, mutual 
funds, futures commission merchants, and introducing brokers in commodities (FinCEN, 2016, p. 
29398). I chose a restrictive definition of financial groups, because while the Bank Secrecy Act 
and Patriot Act have a wider remit of institutions, it is important to differentiate between those 
groups that will be directly affected by the regulation, and those groups that may simply wish to 
mitigate unintended consequences or to make sure that their preferences are recorded in the 
register. I divided actors into these groups based on their self-representation in the comment paper 
preamble, or for the few papers that this was not available, used the “About Us” section on their 
website. All business actors that engage in the comment letters, but are not a part of the covered 
financial sector, are defined as non-financial actors. Any non-affiliated individuals, non-
governmental organisations, or international organisations in the comment letters will be defined 
as civil society groups. Finally, any submissions from politicians or other governmental employees 
will be defined as governmental interest groups.  
I drew my data from the publicly-available online comment papers. The process includes 
two comment paper submission periods, amounting to 93 comment papers issued between March 
and July of 2012, and 163 comment papers issued between August 2014 and January 2016. 
Comment papers are an appropriate choice for gauging the influence of interest groups on 
regulation, as comment submission is both the most commonly used and the most effective tactic 
for interest representation in the regulatory arena (Furlong, 1997). The method through which I 
will gauge the influence of stakeholders is outlined below.  
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Measuring influence is an ambitious endeavour, as it cannot be effectively gauged by 
simple evaluation of whether a lobbyist is successful in achieving their goals. Influence is defined 
as “a causal relation between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome 
itself” (Nagel, 1975, p. 29). This definition indicates the importance of establishing causality 
between actor preferences and the final rule promulgated. Collier et al. (2010) emphasise the 
significance of basing inferences on both data-set and causal-process observations, meaning I must 
consider the data itself, as well as how it fits together. To reliably establish causality, I combined 
measuring the degree of preference attainment based on coding of the comment papers and 
connecting events through process tracing.  
To assess the degree of preference attainment, I used a five-point scale resembling that 
used by Yackee (2005). This method involves two dependent variables: regulatory change, which 
measures the change in the final rule from the proposed rule, and suggested change, which 
measures the responsiveness of the agency to the suggestions made in comment papers. The 
independent variable, interest groups’ suggested change, evaluates how much each stakeholder 
wants the rule to change based on their ideal preferences. The three variables were measured on a 
five-point scale in which 1 represents a moderate shift towards more governmental regulation, 0.5 
indicates a weak shift towards more governmental regulation, 0 represents no shift in the amount 
of regulation, -0.5 indicates a weak shift towards less regulation, and -1 indicates a moderate shift 
towards less regulation (Yackee, 2005).  
I read through all 256 comment papers and identified the top changes suggested by 
commenters. I then created a catalogue of all major changes suggested and identified the most 
frequently addressed issues, which were selected as the main issue categories. I noted the positions 
taken by every actor regarding the main issue categories. I arranged the positions taken according 
to whether they advocate for “less” or “more” regulation. I decided what constituted less or more 
regulation based on the stated position of FinCEN, since actors argue against the notice of 
rulemaking, and not what the current standards are. A copy of the coding scheme is included in 
the appendix. To construct the suggested change variable, I coded all comment papers according 
to these positions. To ensure accurate coding, I assessed every comment paper twice and 
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maintained complete and detailed notes of my decisions3. I took the mean of an actor’s expressed 
positions to be their ideal position.  
Regulatory change is measured according to the measure of success advanced by 
Bernhagen et al. (2014): 
𝑠𝑖𝑗 = 𝑄 − | 𝑥𝑖𝑗 − 𝑂𝑗 | 
This formula4 is interested in the difference between an actor’s ideal point and the final outcome. 
Where sij is the success of an individual actor, Q is the distance between the minimum and 
maximum of the coding scale, xij is the actor’s ideal point on the issue, and Oj is the final regulatory 
outcome of the issue. Success is defined as a regulatory outcome closer to the ideal point, meaning 
that the higher the value of s, the greater the success.  
 The suggested change variable operates on the assumption that if commenters are in 
agreement, the regulator will be more likely to address their concerns (Yackee, 2005). To construct 
this variable, I take the overall average position expressed in the comment papers for each 
identified issue, and compare it to the change in FinCEN’s position between comment periods. For 
instance, if FinCEN was coded as a 0 in 2012, but is coded as a -0.5 in 2014, it will have an 
observed regulatory change of -0.5. If the overall position of the papers argued for less regulation, 
I consider that to indicate that some influence was exerted in that category. However, if FinCEN 
did not exhibit regulatory change, or moved in the opposite direction suggested in the papers, I 
will consider it as no influence.  
Through process tracing, I established the steps through which stakeholders impact 
outcomes. Process tracing entails: evaluating group preferences, how groups attempted to 
                                                 
3 A stronger reliability check was attempted based on the quantitative text analysis using Wordfish advanced by 
Kluver (2009). Wordfish is a statistical scaling model that estimates policy positions of texts based on their word 
frequencies (Kluver, 2009). The model is considered particularly appropriate for interest groups because it does not 
require reference documents to establish positions, as these documents are generally not available in the interest 
group context (Kluver, 2009). Kluver (2009) further found that Wordfish is an appropriate method to cross-validate 
hand codings of policy positions. However, the highly technical nature of the comment papers and short length of 
papers resulted in unusable figures. Wordfish is observed to be less suitable when documents are not sufficiently 
similar, such as in the case for highly technical texts with a high proportion of unique words, and when documents 
have fewer than 1000 words, which was the case for the majority of comment papers (Egerod, 2016). 
4 Bernhagen et al. (2014) also advance two other measures of success, “Improvement compared to reversion point” 
and “ Relative improvement”. Given that these measures returned similar results to the above measure of success, 
and Bernhagen et al. (2014) concluded that all three measures adequately capture success, I proceeded with the most 
simple measurement for my analysis.  
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influence decision-makers, how decision-makers responded to attempted influence, and the degree 
to which preferences are reflected in the final rule (Dür, 2008). This method allowed me to consider 
nearly all sources of influence and trace them through a causal chain.  
To further establish causality, I considered my results in light of alternative explanations 
offered by the literature on financial and business lobbying of regulatory bodies: Presidential and 
Congressional attention, issue salience, and the diversity of outside groups involved. High 
Presidential and Congressional attention can structure the incentives of bureaucrats to favour 
certain interests (McCubbins et al., 1987). While rulemakings generally originate in Congress or 
with the President, it is important to note that many agencies can initiate a rule themselves “when 
the rule furthers the agency’s underlying organizational mission” (Yackee, 2006, p. 725). To avoid 
the effects of high Presidential or Congressional attention, I selected a rule that originated within 
FinCEN, meaning that neither the President nor Congress has invested interests in the ruling.  
In times of high public salience, mounting public opinion pressures politicians and 
bureaucrats to enact reform, even against the strong dissent of business and/or financial lobbies 
(Culpepper, 2011). To approximate salience, I drew from the work of Mahoney (2007) and took 
the number of New York Times (left-wing) and Fox News (right-wing) articles each month between 
2010 and 2016 on the topic of bank secrecy, money laundering, or tax evasion from the Factiva 
database. To my knowledge, no appropriate public opinion polls exist to approximate public 
opinion alongside the salience of the issue.  
The diversity of outside groups also has the potential to impact the amount of influence 
carried by financial and business lobbies. Advocates are more likely to carry influence with fewer 
invested parties, as their preferences can be represented with little opposition (Mahoney, 2007). 
Greater representation of interests may also contribute to a lower degree of financial and business 
unity, as the wider effects of regulation, apart from the directly impacted sectors, are represented 
(Young & Pagliari, 2015). Outside groups are defined in the private sector as groups for whom the 
proposed regulation will not apply. I base this definition on the work of Young and Pagliari (2015) 
and Rasmussen and Carroll (2013), who consider diversity in groups to be those that mobilise 
outside of the regulated sectors. In the public sector, I define comments made by civil society 
groups that are not directly involved in the promotion of financial transparency to be made by 
outsider groups. While a case could be made to consider individual commenters an outsider group, 
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there is not enough information included about who the individual behind the comments is to draw 
any conclusions about potential “outsiders” among individuals. I considered any change in the 
number and diversity of interested groups throughout the period.  
With this design, I have also attempted to address potential limitations with measuring 
influence. Issues in process tracing lobbying influence include: difficulties in establishing the 
causal chain between influence attempts and their outcome, resulting in an under-estimation of 
influence; difficulties in assessing the degree of influence due to no comparable measurement of 
influence; and mistakenly equating the level of interest group activity to the level of influence, 
resulting in an under-estimation of influence (Dür, 2008). Issues in assessing the degree of 
preference attainment include failure to accurately determine the preferences of relevant 
stakeholders and control for alternative factors, resulting in an over-estimation of influence; failing 
to specify the channels through which influence travels; and mis-quantifying the degree of 
influence due to overly-complex topics or under-consideration of the degree of public salience 
(Dür, 2008). In combining the two methods, I was conscious of these issues and attempted to 
explicitly use each method to alleviate issues in the other.  
Analysis 
Federal Agency Rulemaking: The Case of FinCEN  
One area in the US in which the bureaucracy has carried significant influence in making 
and enforcing rules is in anti-money laundering (AML) rules. Money laundering is defined as the 
process whereby criminals can conceal the illegal sources of their funds and make them appear 
legitimate and therefore usable in the economy (FATF, 2018). A key component of laundering 
money is concealing the identity of the true owner of the funds, complicating criminal 
investigations (Findley et al., 2014). The two relevant pieces of legislation that define what is 
“appropriate” for the regulator to pursue in terms of AML are the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) of 
1970 and the Patriot Act of 2001. The BSA requires banks and other covered financial institutions5 
to maintain records of their customers, and vests the Secretary of the Treasury with the power to 
enforce reporting requirements and issue compulsory requests for information to covered 
                                                 
5 Defined as banks and depository institutions, casinos and card clubs, broker-dealers, and investment companies (31 
U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)).  
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institutions (U.S.C. § 5313(a)). The Patriot Act expands the scope of covered institutions6, still 
under the discretion of the Treasury, and expands the information that institutions must collect and 
maintain on their customers to reasonable verification of identity and ensuring that the individual 
is not a known terrorist (USAPA § 326(a)(2)). The most significant effect of these AML rules is 
that what was once considered a right to “customer confidentiality” is now seen with a negative 
connotation as “bank secrecy”, which facilitates global drug trafficking and terrorism7 (Levi, 
2002). Identity information is now not only a legal requirement, but under international best 
practices, goes further than just the individual who opens the account, as financial institutions are 
also expected to have an idea of who actually controls the assets by identifying what is termed as 
the “beneficial owner” (FATF, 2018).  
Despite the high level of Congressional and Presidential attention to the issue, and 
numerous rulemakings by FinCEN, the US fails to adequately collect information on the identities 
of those opening accounts. Despite the high international standards aggressively promoted by the 
US, the 2015 Financial Secrecy Index, measured across fifteen indicators of secrecy across 102 
nations, ranked the US third for financial secrecy, only after Switzerland and Hong Kong 
(Sharman, 2011; Tax Justice Network, 2015). Financial institutions are observably not holding 
themselves to identification standards, as a 2014 study found that anonymous companies are easily 
available in the US (Findley et al., 2014). The US Treasury Department (2015, p. 3) itself observed 
that money-laundering vulnerabilities remain “largely the same” as in 2005. While other countries 
have raised standards in collecting and sharing beneficial ownership information, the US remains 
dead last for requiring companies to collect and maintain beneficial ownership information 
(Transparency International, 2018). Readily available and accurate beneficial ownership 
information is central to effective anti-money laundering legislation, leaving American financial 
institutions held to lower standards than in similar jurisdictions. Given the importance to the US 
and wider international community of anti-money laundering, it is surprising that more effective 
rules have not been passed. 
                                                 
6 The definition in the BSA of “financial institutions” is extended to most notably credit unions, futures commission 
merchants, commodity trading advisors, and commodity pool operators (31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(2)(2003)) 
7 For more information on the detrimental effects of bank secrecy, see: OECD, Behind the Corporate Veil: Using 
Corporate Entities for Illicit Purposes, Paris, 2001.  
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Results 
I find strong evidence that the comment papers submitted by financial and non-financial 
actors influenced the final rule in both the regulatory and suggested change variables. Hypotheses 
1 and 2 are confirmed, as financial and non-financial actors directly affected the content of the 
final rule, while civil societal or governmental actors did not. The results indicate that FinCEN 
made adjustments for less regulation in the majority of identified issues in response to the ideal 
positions of actors in the comment papers. Hypotheses 1a and 1b are partially confirmed, as 
financial and non-financial interests were more unified than those of civil society and all argued 
for less regulation, but specific preferences diverged more than was expected. I will show that 
financial and non-financial interests dominated the comment periods and influenced FinCEN 
towards less regulation, before observing where their specific preferences diverged and where their 
central message was unified. I then discuss how unity in a central message can be especially 
effective when combined with the strategic responsiveness of bureaucrats.  
Stakeholders: Who participated? 
Both comment periods were dominated by groups representing the financial or non-
financial sectors. Financial groups comprised banks, bank associations, credit unions, credit union 
associations, money services, and mutual funds and securities. While the comment papers 
submitted by civil society appear to show significant growth in 2014, 51% were submitted by 
individuals who identify themselves as being associated with the financial sector. The high 
proportion of individuals who self-identified as a member of the financial industry among 
comment papers submitted by individuals contributed to the low level of unity exhibited by civil 
society.  
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Figure 1: Interest Group Composition in 2012 and 2014  
The high proportion of financial and non-financial interests represented in the comment periods is 
significant in light of the necessity for bureaucrats to appear responsive to stakeholders. The 
literature also empirically observes that bureaucrats will be responsive to the message articulated 
by a majority of stakeholders (Nixon et al., 2002; Schmidt, 2002; Yackee, 2005; Yackee & Yackee, 
2006). I will now examine to what extent these actors managed to influence the resulting 
legislation, and how unified they were in doing so.  
Evaluating Influence 
The graphs below show the relationship between ideal preference points and actual 
preference attainment. A majority of preference points fall between 0 and -1, meaning that most 
actors argued for less regulation. Lower preference position scores are accompanied by higher 
preference attainment scores, showing that arguing for less regulation generally garnered a higher 
score for preference attainment. Governmental and civil societal actors are clustered near the 
bottom-right of the graph, since they are the only actors that mostly argued for more regulation, 
and exhibited lower levels of preference attainment. The effect is more pronounced in 2014 than 
in 2012. In 2012, some financial and non-financial actors attained a similar amount of preferences 
as civil society and government. In 2014, civil society and government remained with relatively 
low preference attainment, while all financial and non-financial actors achieved a higher level of 
preference attainment.  
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Figure 2: Ideal Preference Points and Preference Attainment in 2012             Figure 3: Ideal Preference Points and Preference Attainment in 2014 
Note: Due to a large number of interest groups sharing the same ideal position and preference attainment, minor jittering was applied to both graphs.
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The below table shows ideal preference positions and the level of preference attainment 
divided by group. In both comment periods, financial and non-financial interests argued for less 
regulation, while government and civil society argued for more. Financial interests are highlighted 
in orange, non-financial are in yellow, and government and civil society are in green. 
Table 1: Group Ideal Preference Position and Preference Attainment  
Interest Group Ideal Preference 
Position (Mean) 
Ideal Preference 
Position 
(Median) 
Preference 
Attainment 
(Mean) 
Preference 
Attainment 
(Median) 
2012 
Banks -0.43 -0.33 2.42 2.52 
Bank 
Association 
-0.53 -0.50 2.73 2.60 
Non-Financial -0.57 -1.00 2.86 3.50 
Credit Union -0.62 -0.75 2.56 2.87 
Credit Union 
Associations 
-0.29 -0.33 2.26 2.33 
Government 1.00 1.00 1.22 1.22 
Money Services -0.49 -0.50 2.59 2.50 
Mutual 
Funds/Securities 
-0.41 -0.33 2.19 2.17 
Civil Society 0.17 0.50 2.09 1.67 
2014 
Bank -0.45 -0.50 3.26 3.25 
Bank 
Association 
-0.63 -0.67 3.32 3.42 
Non-Financial -0.70 -0.60 3.43 3.50 
Credit Union -0.52 -0.50 3.19 3.00 
Credit Union 
Association 
-0.53 -0.50 3.24 3.25 
Government 0.42 0.50 2.39 2.50 
Money Services -0.46 -0.40 3.22 3.20 
Mutual 
Funds/Securities 
-0.54 -0.72 3.22 3.50 
Civil Society 0.40 0.80 2.39 2.00 
Note: A higher score in preference attainment means more influence, min=1 max=4.  
Groups had higher preference attainment overall in 2014, while their positions mostly 
remained the same or moved towards less regulation. Financial and non-financial interests 
consistently had a higher level of preference attainment than governmental and civil societal 
actors. The influence held by financial and non-financial interests is also confirmed by the 
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suggested change variable, which indicates that FinCEN generally moved in the same direction as 
was suggested by a majority of commenters.  
Table 2: Suggested Change by all Interests  
Category Mean – Ideal 
Positions 
Median – Ideal 
Positions 
Observed Regulatory 
Change 
2012 
Risk Basis -0.08 0.00 1.00 
Definition Beneficial 
Ownership 
-0.12 -0.50 0.00 
Exemptions -0.46 -1.00 -0.50 
Verification -0.08 0.00 -0.50 
Existing Customers -0.45 -1.00 -0.50 
2014 
Definition Beneficial 
Ownership 
-0.02 0.00 -0.50 
Certification Form -0.01 0.00 -1.00 
Verification -0.17 -0.50 -1.00 
Exemptions -0.45 -1.00 -1.00 
Existing Customers -0.46 -1.00 -100 
Monitoring -0.28 0.00 -0.50 
 
In many categories in the above table, it appears that FinCEN moved even further towards 
less regulation than was suggested in the comment papers. Large gaps also appear between the 
mean and median in ideal positions. However, the picture is much clearer once the ideal positions 
of governmental and civil societal actors are removed, as shown in the following table.  
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Table 3: Suggested Change by Financial and Non-Financial Interests  
Category Mean – Ideal 
Positions 
Median – Ideal 
Positions 
Observed Regulatory 
Change 
2012 
Risk Basis -0.20 0.00 1.00 
Definition Beneficial 
Ownership 
-0.36 -0.50 0.00 
Exemptions -0.58 -1.00 -0.50 
Verification -0.32 -0.50 -0.50 
Existing Customers -0.82 -1.00 -0.50 
2014 
Definition Beneficial 
Ownership 
-0.38 -0.50 -0.50 
Certification Form -0.23 0.00 -1.00 
Verification -0.53 -0.50 -1.00 
Exemptions -0.60 -0.50 -1.00 
Existing Customers -0.79 -1.00 -1.00 
Monitoring -0.38 0.00 -0.50 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are confirmed: financial and non-financial interests influenced the 
content of the final rule, while governmental and civil societal interests had little effect on the final 
rule. Two examples from my identified issue areas are useful in illustrating how bureaucrats may 
act strategically in their responsiveness.  
The agency exhibited limited responsiveness in the “Risk Basis” category—the only issue 
area for which FinCEN moved towards more regulation. This category involves responses to the 
question of when beneficial ownership information should be required. This part involved the only 
new expectation established by the rule and is considered a “key element of a broader U.S. 
Department of the Treasury strategy to enhance financial transparency” (FinCEN, 2012, p. 13047), 
as previously, identification was limited to the account holder and did not include consideration of 
who actually controls the funds. All other issue areas were framed as “codifying, clarifying and 
strengthening existing [customer due diligence] expectations”, making them less central to 
justifying the rule (FinCEN, 2012, p. 13047). This issue area was therefore one of key interest for 
the regulator, as any move towards less regulation, or even remaining at the same amount, would 
defeat the main stated purpose of the proposed rule. Withdrawal of the rule would reflect poorly 
upon the agency: significant resources are already invested in preparing the notice of rulemaking, 
and FinCEN exercised its own autonomy in initiating the rule, meaning that to remove it would 
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send a message of its own shortcomings in expertise (Naughton et al., 2009; Carpenter, 2014). The 
benefits of responsiveness were limited in this issue category, causing FinCEN to behave 
strategically and continue with its original intention. 
FinCEN was responsive to a majority of voices in its move towards less regulation in one 
of the aspects of its definition of beneficial ownership. In the 2012 advance notice of proposed 
rulemaking, FinCEN places the threshold ownership level to be considered a beneficial owner at 
above 25%. A common preference throughout the civil societal and governmental papers is for 
this threshold to be lowered to 10%, since 25% will make it too easy for criminals to restructure 
ownership and avoid identifying themselves. This suggestion is taken into account in the 2014 
notice of proposed rulemaking, which emphasises that the outlined obligations are only the 
minimum, noting that a lower percentage, “such as 10 percent” can be warranted “based on [an 
institution’s] assessment of risk” (FinCEN, 2014, p. 45158). While governmental and civil societal 
comment papers in response continued to argue that this standard is not stringent enough, financial 
actors took major issue with the mention of 10%, arguing that it opens the door to inconsistent 
examiner interpretation and the slow over-extension of regulations. In the final rule, 10% is no 
longer suggested as a risk-based lower threshold, and is instead only mentioned in terms of 
FinCEN denying the change. The language used to deny the change echoes the arguments made 
by financial actors, who protested against the fact that “as many as eleven beneficial owners” 
would need to be identified, argued that current US and international standards only require 25%, 
and that the benefits of such a threshold would be outweighed by the costs (FinCEN, 2016, p. 
29410). The domination of financial interests in the comment period, both in sheer numbers and 
in the influence exerted, reflects the simple arguments made by Nixon et al. (2002), Yackee (2005), 
and Yackee and Yackee (2006), who contended that strength in numbers is effective in changing 
regulatory outcomes. However, it is still not clear how voices that were disunified in specific 
preferences managed to influence FinCEN towards less regulation.  
Evaluating Unity 
I now turn to my expectations for financial and non-financial unity in Hypotheses 1a and 
1b, which are partially confirmed. While private interests were united in disagreeing with the need 
for more regulation and arguing that the costs of the regulation far outweighed the benefits, the 
comments were more diverse in the specifics of these positions. In the next sections, I will first 
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illustrate how specific preferences diverged, before turning to how these differences were 
deemphasised through an effective central message.  
Unity: In Preferences 
The table below shows different measures of unity across ideal preference positions and 
preference attainment positions. Since each variable is significantly non-normal, I assess unity 
across three measures: a large difference in the mean and median, a large range, and a large 
standard deviation.  
Table 4: Unity in Ideal Preference Positions  
Comment Period Difference 
Mean/Median 
(>0.25) 
Range (>1.25) SD (>0.5) 
2012 Non-Financial 
Civil Society 
Bank Associations* 
Non-Financial 
Civil Society 
Non-Financial 
Civil Society 
2014 Civil Society Civil Society Civil Society 
 
Table 5: Unity in Preference Attainment Positions  
Comment Period Difference 
Mean/Median 
(>0.25) 
Range (>2.25) SD (>1.00) 
2012 Non-Financial 
Credit Unions 
Civil Society 
 
Non-Financial 
Credit Unions 
Mutual 
Funds/Securities 
Civil Society 
Non-Financial* 
Credit Unions 
Mutual 
Funds/Securities* 
Civil Society 
2014 Civil Society Civil Society Civil Society 
Note: *means that the measure of interest is right on the threshold score  
Stronger unity can be discerned in 2014 than in 2012. While civil society is consistently 
the least united, non-financial firms show a surprising amount of disunity in 2012. However, this 
disunity can be explained by one of the identified control variables—the mobilisation of outside 
groups. In 2012, a large number of casinos and precious metals dealers submitted comments. Once 
it became clear that the regulation would not apply to them, casinos allowed their interests to be 
represented by the American Gaming Association, and precious metals did not comment.  
The change in unity is clarified by observing the progression of the rulemaking from its 
first signs to the end of the notice and comment period and final rule. FinCEN released Guidance 
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on Obtaining and Retaining Beneficial Ownership Information in 2010, which did not impose any 
new expectations and sought to clarify existing standards. The response was minimal, with four 
associations representing mutual funds and securities interests publicly responding to the 
publication. The issues raised in their comments were similar to those later submitted in 2012, 
emphasising that to create a categorical requirement for the collection of beneficial ownership 
information will be too burdensome for the financial sector to absorb the costs. However, the 
overall focus in 2012 for the regulator and commenters was the provision of information, where 
the comments concentrated on explaining current procedures and their associated costs to FinCEN. 
The main divergence among the preferences of financial and non-financial actors was the idea that 
they could maintain their competitive advantage by either pushing the costs onto other financial or 
non-financial actors, or pressing for specific exceptions for their type of institution. This position, 
while common in the 2012 comment papers, was taken by few actors in the 2014 papers. By 2014, 
unity increased as the financial and non-financial actors lost faith in the possibility that a new 
regulation would not apply to them.  
The most relevant topic8 for groups in both comment periods was exemptions—a majority 
of commenters in all groups submitted their preferences for exemptions in 2012, and the only 
groups that did not in 2014 were non-financial interests, governmental interests and civil societal 
interests. While there are numerous examples of disunity among issue preferences, I will focus on 
the discussion surrounding exemptions. Nearly all financial and non-financial comment papers 
expressed that trusts must be exempted, while governmental and civil societal papers emphasised 
that trusts carry their own unique risks for money laundering that must be addressed. FinCEN 
leaned towards exempting trusts in 2012, and confirmed that they would be completely exempted 
in 2014. Interesting, however, was the disunity in the specific calls for exceptions, as many 
comment papers from non-bank groups sought to exempt their type of financial firm from the 
regulation. These papers did not argue for exceptions to extend to other groups as well, and in 
some cases even attempted to point the finger at other types of financial firms for being more risky 
for money laundering than their own. While all groups argued for more exemptions, they often 
came in direct disagreement as to what exemptions were appropriate.  
                                                 
8 A full break-down of which actors commented on what categories is included in Table 6 in the appendix. 
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Moving from what was said to who was saying it, associations representing many actors 
tended to remain more general in addressing across issue categories, while specific actors tended 
to speak towards their own “niche” in order to best protect their own competitive interests. This 
observation is consistent with expectations regarding highly technical and complex legislation, as 
information asymmetries between different sectors are amplified, and there are fewer specific 
preferences around which to converge (Young & Pagliari, 2015; Roemer-Mahler, 2013). The 
effect can be likened to a funnel, in which banks and their associations are more general and 
address problems across the board, while preferences become more and more specific as one 
moves from the provision of banking services overall to the more specific interests of such 
industries as money services and mutual funds and securities. For instance, in the case of 
exemptions, bank associations by far listed the highest number of exemptions, while credit unions 
often only asked for small credit unions to be exempted. This structure contributed to the increased 
unity seen in 2014, as the provision of information was more central to the comment papers 
submitted in 2012, while by 2014, financial and non-financial interests were directly challenging 
the proposed changes. While financial and non-financial actors were united in their disagreement 
with more regulation, their ideas of what the regulation would look like were largely dictated by 
the technical needs of their industry. These preferences created a conundrum for FinCEN as to 
how to appear responsive to diverse calls unified by their desire for less regulation.  
Unity: In Framing 
In explaining how financial and non-financial interests managed to carry influence on the 
final rule despite their lower-than-expected unity in commenting on specific issues, it is necessary 
to consider their consistent unity in framing the issue. Financial and non-financial interests 
managed to place the focus of the regulator from the benefits of AML regulation to the costs placed 
on financial institutions. Governmental and civil societal interests framed the burden as an 
opportunity, but it failed to sway FinCEN. A consistent challenge regarding the cost and necessity 
of a rule from a majority of actors and throughout the comment period was a more effective 
argument than the diffused and uncertain benefits portrayed by a minority of interests.  
In the response to the 2010 guidance and the 2012 advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 
the possibility of a categorical requirement to collect beneficial ownership information was already 
portrayed as a costly endeavour that must be subject to sufficient industry input in the event of a 
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new regulation. There was a constant focus on need, with the claim made that since the regulation 
is not necessary, it is not useful to AML efforts. However, financial and non-financial interests 
also argued that the proposed regulation largely duplicates current procedures. The actors further 
asserted that the proposed guidelines were “too vague”, but also argued against a “one-size-fits-
all” approach, creating a contradictory position for which it was hard for FinCEN to respond.  
By 2014, while continuing to maintain that the regulation is not necessary, the sectors 
become more focussed on minimising the costs and emphasising the intangibility of the benefits. 
The influence of this framing is reflected in the discussion of the Regulatory Impact Assessment 
by FinCEN in the final rule. FinCEN(2016, p. 29426) states that the challenges of quantifying 
costs and analysing benefits on an academic basis, “led [them] to rely predominantly upon 
breakeven analysis”, which explicitly compares costs and benefits by asking how large the value 
of benefits must be in order to be equal to the value of costs. FinCEN (2016, p. 29427) further 
states that they have “made numerous changes to the rule itself….so as to minimize as much as 
possible the impact of compliance upon covered financial institutions while still furthering the 
purposes of the rule”. The ruling, which was considered to carry a low economic impact when the 
initial analysis was conducted in 2015, was upgraded as carrying an economically significant 
effect9, showing a significant scaling up of the costs.  
Consistent throughout the submissions by financial and non-financial actors was the 
message that the rule was not justified. These arguments followed three main frames: the 
regulation is a case of regulatory overreach and will lead to ever-increasing costs to and 
inconsistent examiner review for finance; it is unfair to impart this cost to the financial industry, 
and the responsibility should instead be at the state or federal level; or the costs simply outweigh 
the benefits too much for the regulation to be effective. Positions confirming the need for the 
regulation either simply confirmed that the need was there, and sought to best balance the costs 
and the benefits, or argued that the proposed amount of regulation is not enough and must go even 
further. The graphs below show the disproportionate number of actors that found the rule to be 
unjustified.  
                                                 
9 Economically significant regulations are defined under Section 6 of Executive Order 12866 to be those with an 
annual impact on the economy of $100 million or more, or that will tangibly have negative effects on the entire 
economy or relevant defined sectors (Carey, 2016). 
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Figure 4: Framing Techniques Regarding the Rule’s Justification  
Three framings explicitly argued for less regulation, while one framing argued for less regulation 
for the most part, and only one framing both justified the regulation and argued for it to go further. 
These results confirm the conclusions of Yackee (2006), who challenged the conventional wisdom 
advanced by Wilson (1989) that consensus in the comments matters, as the central message 
mattered more in influencing FinCEN towards less regulation than the specific details as to what 
less regulation should look like. Even though groups failed to unify around what less regulation 
would look like, they managed to destabilise the need and emphasise the costs of more regulation. 
Alternative Explanations 
My results remain consistent when alternative explanations are considered. The three 
alternative explanations I consider are that high Presidential and Congressional attention will 
weaken interest group influence or favour certain groups, that high mobilisation of outside groups 
will weaken unity, and that high public salience of an issue will weaken the influence of business 
(McCubbins et al., 1987; Culpepper, 2011; Mahoney, 2007). 
McCubbins et al. (1987) predict that interest groups may carry less influence in cases with 
high Presidential and Congressional attention. Agencies may choose to engage with groups in-line 
with the governmental position (McCubbins et al., 1987). Alternatively, the salience of 
responsiveness would be reduced because Congressional or Presidential backing of a proposed 
regulation adds legitimacy and reduces the chances of a successful court challenge (Yackee, 2005). 
Presidential and Congressional attention were virtually non-existent, as the rule originated with 
FinCEN and only one Congressman submitted a comment paper. I can expect that the 
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considerations of bureaucrats in responding to comment papers was not disproportionately affected 
by Congressional or Presidential influence.  
A high proportion of outside groups can be expected to reduce the potential for financial 
and non-financial influence and unity, as a greater diversity of interests are potentially represented, 
which multiplies the preferences for bureaucrats to respond and the possible coalitions around 
which to form (Mahoney, 2007; Young & Pagliari, 2015). There was little mobilisation of outside 
groups, with non-financial commenters consisting of life insurance providers, precious metals 
dealers, risk management services, and one association representing small businesses. All civil 
society groups that commented were groups explicitly involved in promoting financial 
transparency. Twelve outsider groups commented in 2012, but in 2014 this number dropped to six 
as it became clear to casinos and precious metals dealers that their interests were protected. While 
these groups are certainly considered outsiders in the context of the rule, as it does not apply to 
them, their interest in the rule is mediated by their stakes in the financial industry. I can therefore 
expect their preferences to be similar to those of finance. Between the small proportion of non-
financial organisations that commented and the nature of their interest in the regulation, it is 
unlikely that mobilisation of outsiders had an effect on the observed influence and unity among 
stakeholders. 
High salience of a certain issue can rally public opinion and attention enough to 
counterbalance the dominant presence of financial and non-financial interests (Culpepper, 2011). 
Media attention remains consistent throughout the period, as shown in the graph below. Around 
thirty-five articles were published per month, with no spikes at the point of rule proposal 
publication, or a trend upwards. It is unlikely that increased salience of anti-money laundering had 
an impact on the regulation. 
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Source: Factiva Database 
Figure 5: Issue Salience in Left-Wing and Right-Wing News in the US 
Discussion: Central Messages Matter, Issue Preferences May Not 
Financial and non-financial interests dominated the comment periods and exhibited unity 
in framing the regulation as too costly and unnecessary. A majority of actors framed the rule as 
exerting unjustified and excessive costs, which multiplied reputational concerns for the regulator, 
causing them to respond to the minimum demands given by a majority of commenters for less 
regulation. FinCEN strongly cares about its reputation and is highly dependent on the continuing 
support of its various stakeholders.  
Unified voices arguing that the regulation was unjustified in its cost is an especially 
effective framing to influence FinCEN due to its position in the wider American rulemaking 
environment. FinCEN, as a government agency, possesses no authority vested by the constitution 
or democratic elections. The agency instead is mandated to listen to the authority of multiple 
voices—the system of shared control headed by the Congress and the President, the information 
provided by organised interests, and the monitoring provided by the courts (Yackee, 2006). Being 
seen as responsive to organised interests is important to FinCEN, as it reduces the potential for 
future court challenges, or the possibility for the Congress or the President to dissolve the agency 
altogether (Yackee, 2005). This dynamic is particularly strong for the AML role that FinCEN 
fulfills, as banks have “never much liked” the BSA due to its “technical and detailed” compliance 
measures, widely perceiving its requirements to be overly burdensome and ineffectual (Gouvin, 
2003, p.963-4). The Patriot Act was similarly poorly received (Gouvin, 2003). Once one considers 
the impact of the “judicialization” of rulemaking in light of a highly technical and unpopular 
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legislation, it can be expected that very little can be accomplished by the regulator without heavy 
reliance on the regulated industry.  
In nearly every single comment paper, financial actors gave their support to FinCEN’s 
declared mission of AML in the ruling, and to the goal of crime reduction more generally. This 
overall support was then followed by what was framed as minor adjustments with a big impact to 
reducing costs. There was either little consideration for the concordant reduction in benefits, or 
claims made to minimise perceptions of benefits. FinCEN was convinced that the adjustments 
made were small and did not think that the changes would significantly damage crime reduction. 
A Treasury spokeswoman claimed that the rule was “largely finalised as it was proposed”, and that 
the final rule will be “even more effective” than was originally proposed10. This statement goes 
directly against the chorus of dissent from civil society, who contend that several of the changes 
made had serious implications for the rule’s effectiveness11. Arguably, FinCEN succeeded in being 
seen as legitimate—financial institutions are slowly making the required changes with no 
foreseeable court challenges, and most notably, the Obama administration cited the regulation 
when announcing its own further steps to combat money laundering12. While civil society and 
some governmental actors continue to voice dissent13, the ones that are the most visible for 
FinCEN’s reputation generally support the new regulation. In fact, had the Obama administration’s 
announced steps continued into the current administration14, it is likely that FinCEN would have 
also managed to enhance its power.  
In highly technical and complex issues, small details that are understood by few can have 
wide-ranging implications for which it is hard for anyone except experts to assess the impact. As 
is noted throughout the literature, financial interests are ideally placed to respond to complex 
                                                 
10 https://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2016/05/06/u-s-gives-banks-more-time-to-identify-corporate-owners/  
11 
https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/us_treasury_issues_new_rules_on_customer_due_diligence_but_ga
ps_remain_and 
https://thefactcoalition.org/wp-content/cache/all/anti-money-laundering-experts-deeply-concerned-by-
administrations-flawed-panama-papers-response//index.html 
https://www.salon.com/2016/05/10/the_obama_administrations_panama_papers_misfire_why_new_rules_to_curtail
_global_tax_avoidance_could_actually_make_things_worse/  
12 https://www.pymnts.com/bank-regulation/2018/giact-beneficial-ownership-compliance-due-diligence/  
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/05/fact-sheet-obama-administration-announces-
steps-strengthen-financial  
13 https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/g20_leaders_or_laggards 
http://www.taxhistory.org/www/features.nsf/Articles/FB22E89F3424B5C285257FBE00578A6B?OpenDocument  
14 https://www.americanbanker.com/news/next-stop-on-the-reg-relief-train-reforming-aml-rules  
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issues, as they possess the expertise and ability to mobilise in large numbers (Lindblom, 1977; 
Cerny, 1994; Young & Pagliari, 2015). Federal agencies are most likely to respond to the most 
repeated preferences in comment periods (Nixon et al., 2002; Yackee, 2005). In particular, Yackee 
and Yackee (2006) found strong support for their hypothesis that the strength in business’ numbers 
makes a difference in the influence carried, while the quality of information provision made little 
difference. My findings support this interpretation—the quality of information provided by civil 
society and government in the comment papers was generally very high. The groups gave specific 
figures as to the estimated benefits of the regulation, but these figures seemed to be drowned out 
by the chorus of voices from financial and non-financial interests arguing that the rule was too 
costly and unjustified. With business able to best mobilise in high numbers and present a unified 
overall message, we can expect that bureaucrats will be responsive to their preferences.  
What is important, as stated by Yackee (2006) is the central message delivered by 
stakeholders, as the regulator attempts to balance across groups in the interest of being seen as a 
fair and legitimate actor. There are multiple dimensions to any issue, regardless of complexity, and 
what ultimately may matter for influence is the ability to emphasise some aspects over others 
(Borang & Naurin, 2015). The difference between policy issues and policy frames comes down to 
not specific rulings under debate, but what is seen as “at stake” in terms of the policy debate 
(Borang & Naurin, 2015, p. 501). In the case of this ruling, it was not the specific adjustments that 
mattered, but that the costs were seen as ultimately more salient than the benefits. We can expect 
bureaucrats to act strategically in responding to what is “at stake”—if actors can present a unified 
message of high stakes, the regulator may be moved to reduce a rule’s impact in the interest of 
protecting themselves from what they perceive to be potentially damaging to their reputation. 
Reputation must be considered by scholars in the case of rulemakings by American federal 
agencies. Reputation is coproduced among actors, as agencies attempt to manage the expectations 
and demands of diverse audiences (Busuioc et al., 2017). The agency needs support from its 
various networks, or else it faces destabilisation through low compliance, a lack of political support 
for their goals, or even the termination of the agency (Carpenter, 2014). This mechanism is 
effective for federal agencies, since their rulemaking authority wholly depends on being seen as 
legitimate by its audiences. Reputation, in fact, may be the most important policy good for federal 
agencies to secure in order to ensure their survival (Pfeffer & Salanick, 1978). The regulator is 
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therefore interested in being seen as having engaged in “effective participation”, which involves 
satisfying the minimum demands of a majority of commenters if it cannot mount a politically and 
legally sound case for the regulation (Schmidt, 2002, p. 73). In the case of AML, a highly complex 
area in which the benefits are largely academic, while the costs are estimated through more tangible 
means, effective participation is central to a legitimate ruling. Financial and non-financial interests 
therefore only had to create enough uncertainty in the agency regarding the evidence of benefits 
or necessity to nudge FinCEN towards less regulation. In highly technical and complex issues 
headed by a specialised regulator, in which it may be hard for financial and non-financial interests 
to agree on specific policy issues, the most effective path to influence may be to attempt to 
delegitimise the regulation and, by its extension, the regulator.   
Conclusion  
This research has attempted to illuminate the mechanisms through which private actors 
may manage to influence federal agencies. Bureaucrats occupy a unique position in rulemaking in 
which they both depend on stakeholders for resources and legitimacy and are legally mandated to 
be responsive to them. The opposing incentives presented to regulators require them to act 
strategically in their responsiveness to stakeholders. This process is complicated by the agency’s 
dependence on its reputation, the judicialization of rulemaking, and the disproportionate unity of 
business. Bureaucrats find themselves in a difficult position, as they must be perceived as 
responsive in order to maintain their position and avoid court challenge, but must also strive to 
keep private interests in check. I observed these dynamics at play in the case of the 2016 final rule 
by FinCEN, Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions. I expected to find 
that finance and business had greater influence on the final rule than civil societal and 
governmental interests, and moreover expected to find striking unity in the overall preferences of 
the sectors. While I did find that private interests carried significant influence on the final rule, 
while civil societal and governmental interests carried little to no influence, the unity found among 
these interests was lower than I expected. When a majority of voices come from the business or 
financial sector, and furthermore are unified in a message that delegitimises the ruling and by 
extension, the regulator, the resulting rule is likely to be highly reflective of private interests.  
Scholars remain divided as to whether the dynamics of federal agencies under the 
Administrative Procedures Act achieve its stated goals of increased transparency, accessibility and 
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accountability. Interactions are theorised to result in more effective, stable policy (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 1993; Baumgartner et al. 2009) and observed to allow for a diversity of voices in input 
(Croley, 2000; Golden, 1998; Nixon et al., 2002). However, other scholars theorised that legal 
incentives for responsiveness result in policy reflecting only certain interests (West, 1984; Magat 
et al., 1986) and observed that private interests are favoured in input (Yackee, 2005; Yackee & 
Yackee, 2006). My results lend support to the latter interpretation of federal rulemakings, as the 
unified message of finance and business for less regulation were reflected in the change from the 
proposed rule to the final result.  
The literature is also divided on the nature and impact of business unity on federal agency 
rulemakings. Business unity is the prediction whereby business is expected to exert greater 
influence than other groups due to its superior ability to mobilise and remain unified (Smith, 2000). 
Unity is generally seen as particularly strong in the financial sector, and especially in the 
institutional context of the US (Young & Pagliari, 2015; Hacker & Pierson, 2010). However, some 
scholars claim that unity cannot be automatically assumed (Truman, 1951; Lowery & Gray, 2004), 
while others point to mitigating factors for unity such as high public salience, high mobilisation of 
outside groups, and attention from the President or Congress (Culpepper, 2011; McCubbins et al., 
1987; Smith, 2000). Disagreement also remains as to whether unity in specific demands is 
important, or in the central message sent (Clapp & Helleier, 2012; Yackee, 2006). My results 
support the findings of Yackee (2006), as bureaucrats may choose to be responsive to the central 
message sent, even when preferences are not highly unified.  
While the results of my study point to the importance of private sector influence during 
comment periods and the relevance of unity, my research comes with a number of limitations. 
Finance is identified as a sector with consistently higher levels of unity than others (Young & 
Pagliari, 2015), and we may find a less pronounced effect in other sectors. I also did not evaluate 
unity for a ruling in which mitigating factors for unity were present, meaning that influence or 
unity may be less pronounced in rulings with different attributes (Culpepper, 2011; McCubbins et 
al., 1987; Smith, 2000). I observe only one policy issue and venue, so there may be unobserved 
interaction effects between different issue and agency types, particularly given the highly technical 
nature of the observed ruling (Braun, 2012). Further unobserved variables could take place at 
different stages in the policy cycle, as input is given to legislation before it even translates into 
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authority at the level of federal agencies (Chubb, 1983; McCubbins et al., 1987). The lack of a 
reliability check also represents a significant limitation of my study, as replication of my study 
could yield different coding categories and ultimately different results. 
These limitations, however, when considered in light of my results and the broader 
literature, point to further avenues of research. This study is situated among the broader literature 
that considers the impact of business interests on governance, drawing increasing concern over the 
effectiveness of legislation and regulation, given the disproportionate influence of private interests. 
Yackee (2005), Yackee (2006), and Yackee and Yackee (2006) provided the quantitative work 
that indicated that bureaucrats do change rules in response to notice and comment papers, and 
moreover favour business interests in doing so. My research gives insight into the claim by Yackee 
(2006) that the central message sent in comment papers matters. I therefore stress the conclusion 
of Yackee (2005, p. 119) that additional quantitative research is needed to “sort out the full 
relationship between interest group influence and bureaucratic responsiveness during all stages of 
rulemaking.” This research is particularly important when one considers the “coupling of direct 
elections and private funding of elections in the US[, which] leads to a system with incentives for 
elected officials to be more responsive to wealthier actors” (Mahoney, 2007, p. 54). Better 
understanding of under what conditions business can unify and influence governance at all stages 
in the policymaking process is necessary to ensure fair and effective regulations in the future. My 
results are also interesting in light of the wider literature that compares regulatory dynamics in the 
US to the European Union (EU). Given the significant differences in interest group environments 
between the US and EU identified by Mahoney (2007), most notably that in the EU compromise 
is more likely, it would be interesting to perform a similar study in the EU context to see how the 
dynamics compare.  
In conclusion, my research lends support to the growing concern over financial and 
business influence in the US. While I do not consider my results to support claims of regulatory 
capture (Bernsten, 1955; Lowi, 1969; Stigler, 1971; Carpenter, 2004), I do find that the judicial 
aspect of federal rulemakings in the US may be under-emphasised. Pfeffer and Salanick (1978) 
caution of a future in which organisations develop extreme interdependence, weakening 
possibilities for risk taking and uncertainty. The increased potential for court challenges magnifies 
the impact of pre-empting criticism and being perceived as responsive, creating significant 
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incentives for bureaucrats to consider what is written in comment papers (Hrebenar, 1997; Funk 
et al., 1997; Carpenter, 2014). With comment papers considered the most common vehicle for 
regulatory lobbying influence, the potential implications of disproportionate financial and business 
influence are vast (Furlong, 1997). The claim of the “judicialization” of rulemaking made by West 
(1984, p. 390) may have a greater impact in the US than originally considered. As Yackee and 
Yackee (2006, p. 138) state in their conclusion, “whether notice and comment procedures 
themselves may be more effectively designed to equalize participation and influence is perhaps 
the question most worthy of further evaluation and empirical scrutiny”. It is important we develop 
our understanding further of when and how unity changes rulemaking outcomes in order to better 
understand the influence of business and finance in federal agencies in the US.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
References 
Baker, A. (2010). Restraining regulatory capture? Anglo-America, crisis politics and trajectories 
of change in global financial governance. International Affairs, 86(3), 647-663. 
Balla, S. J. (1998). Administrative procedures and political control of the bureaucracy. American 
Political Science Review, 92, 663-673. 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Jones, B. D. (1993). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. 
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, F. R., & Leech, B. L. (1998). Basic Interests. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Baumgartner, F. R., Berry, J. M., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D. C., & Leech, B. L. (2009). Lobbying 
and Policy Change. Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago, IL: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Baumgartner, F., & Leech, B. (2001). Issue Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest 
Group Involvement in National Politics. Journal of Politics, 63, 1191-1213. 
Bernhagen, P., Dür, A., & Marshall, D. (2014). Measuring lobbying success spatially. Interest 
Groups & Advocacy, 3(2), 202-218. 
Bernstein, M. (1955). Regulating Business by Independent Commission. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Berry, J. M. (1989). The interest group society (2nd Ed.). Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman and 
Company. 
Boräng, F., & Naurin, D. (2015). ‘Try to see it my way!’ Frame congruence between lobbyists 
and European Commission officials. Journal of European Public Policy, 22(4), 499-515. 
Braun, C. (2012). The Captive or the Broker? Explaining Public Agency-Interest Group 
Interactions. Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and 
Institutions, 25(2), 291-314. 
Broz, J. L. (1999). Origins of the Federal Reserve System: International Incentives and the 
Domestic Free-rider Problem. International Organization, 53, 39-70. 
Busuioc, M., & Lodge, M. (2017). Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing 
Accountability Expectations through Reputation. Public Administration Review, 77(1), 
91-100. 
Carey, M. P. (2016). Counting Regulations: An Overview of Rulemaking, Types of Federal 
Regulations, and Pages in the Federal Register. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service. 
Carpenter, D. (2004). Protection without Capture: Product Approval by a Politically Responsive, 
Learning Regulatory. American Political Science Review, 98(4), 613-631. 
39 
Carpenter, D. (2014). Reputation and Power. In D. Carpenter, Reputation and Power. In: 
Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and Pharmaceutical Regulation at the 
FDA (pp. 33-70). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Cerny, P. (1994). The Infrastructure of the Infrastructure? Toward “Embedded Financial 
Orthodoxy” in the International Political Economy. In R. P. Palan, & B. (. Gills, 
Transcending the State-Global Divide: A Neostructuralist Agenda in International 
Relations (pp. 223-249). Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishing. 
Chubb, J. E. (1983). Interest groups and the bureaucracy: The politics of energy. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
Clapp, J., & Helleiner, E. (2012). Troubled Futures? The Global Food Crisis and the Politics of 
Agricultural Derivatives Regulation. Review of International Political Economy, 19, 181-
207. 
Collier, D., Brady, H., & Seawright, J. (2010). Sources of Leverage in Causal Inference: Toward 
and Alternative View of Methodology. In H. Brady, & D. Collier, Rethinking Social 
Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards (pp. 229-266). Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield. 
Crews, C. W. (2018, January 2). The 2018 Unconstitutionality Index: 28 Federal Agency Rules 
for Every Law Congress Passes. Retrieved September 6, 2018, from Competitive 
Enterprise Institute: https://cei.org/blog/2018-unconstitutionality-index-28-federal-
agency-rules-every-law-congress-passes 
Croley, S. P. (2000). Public Interested Regulation. Florida State Law Review, 28(1), 7-107. 
Cropper, M. L., Evans, W. N., Berardi, S. J., Ducla-Soares, M. M., & Portney, P. R. (1992). The 
determinants of pesticide regulation: A statistical analysis of EPA decision making. 
Journal of Political Economy, 100, 175-197. 
Culpepper, P. (2011). Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and 
Japan. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Dür, A. (2008). Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU: A Note on Methodology. 
European Union Politics, 9(4), 559-576. 
Egerod, B. C. (2016). Poisson Scaling of Interest Group Positions from Text in EU 
Consultations. Paper presented at Amsterdam Text Analysis Conference. 
Falkner, R. (2007). Business Power and Conflict in International Environmental Politics. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
FATF. (2018). Money laundering. Retrieved September 6, 2018, from Financial Action Task 
Force: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/faq/moneylaundering/ 
40 
FinCEN: Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions; Advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. § 13046 (March 5, 2012) (final rule May 11, 2016) 
(to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, et al.). 
FinCEN: Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions; Notice of proposed 
rulemaking, 79 Fed. Reg. § 45151 (August 4, 2014) (final rule May 11, 2016) (to be 
codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, et al.). 
FinCEN: Customer Due Diligence Requirements for Financial Institutions; Final rules, 81 Fed. 
Reg. § 29398 (May 11, 2016) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pts. 1010, 1020, 1023, et al.). 
Findley, M., Nielson, D., & Sharman, J. (2014). Global Shell Games: Experiments in 
Transnational Relations, Crime, and Terrorism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Funk, W. F., Shapiro, S. A., & Weaver, R. L. (1997). Administrative procedure and practice: 
Problems and cases. St. Paul, MN: West. 
Furlong, S. R. (1997). Interest group influence on rulemaking. Administration and Society, 29, 
325-348. 
Golden, M. M. (1998). Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: Who Participates? Whose 
Voices Get Heard? Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 8(2), 245-
270. 
Gouvin, E. J. (2003). Bringing out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering, and 
the War on Terrorism. Baylor Law Review, 55, 955-990. 
Hacker, J. S., & Pierson, P. (2010). Winner-Take-All Politics: Public Policy, Political 
Organization, and the Precipitous Rise of Top Incomes in the United States. Politics & 
Society, 38(2), 152-204. 
Hacker, J. S., & Pierson, P. (2014). After the “Master Theory”: Downs, Schattschneider, and the 
Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis. Perspectives on Politics, 12(3), 643-662. 
Hrebenar, R. J. (1997). Interest group politics in America. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Kerwin, C. M. (2003). Rulemaking: How Government Agencies Write Law and Make Policy. 
Washington, DC: CQ Press. 
Kerwin, C. M., & Furlong, S. R. (1992). Time and rulemaking: An empirical test of theory. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2, 113-138. 
Kluver, H. (2009). Measuring Interest Group Influence Using Quantitative Text Analysis. 
European Union Politics, 10(4), 535-549. 
Kluver, H. (2011). The contextual nature of lobbying: Explaining lobbying success in the 
European Union. European Union Politics, 12(4), 483-506. 
Levi, M. (2002). Money Laundering and Its Regulation. The Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Science, 582, 181-194. 
41 
Lindblom, C. (1977). Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books. 
Lowery, D., & Gray, V. (2004). A Pluralist Perspective on Research on Organized Interests. 
Political Research Quarterly, 57(1), 163-175. 
Lowi, T. J. (1969). The End of Liberalism. New York: Norton. 
Magat, W. A., Krupnick, A. J., & Harrington, W. (1986). Rules in the making: A statistical 
analysis of regulatory agency behavior. Washington, DC: Resources for the Future. 
Mahoney, C. (2007). Lobbying Success in the United States and the European Union. Journal of 
Public Policy, 27(1), 35-56. 
McCubbins, M. D., Noll, R. G., & Weingast, B. R. (1987). Administrative procedures as 
instruments of political control. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 3, 243-
247. 
Nagel, J. H. (1975). The Descriptive Analysis of Power. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Naughton, K., Schmid, C., Yackee, S. W., & Zhan, X. (2009). Understanding Commenter 
Influence During Agency Rule Development. Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management, 28(2), 258-277. 
Nixon, D. C., Howard, R. M., & DeWitt, J. R. (2002). With Friends Like These: Rule-Making 
Comment Submissions to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory, 12(1), 59-76. 
Nownes, A. (2006). Total Lobbying: What Lobbyists Want (and How They Try to Get It). 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Pagliari, S., & Young, K. (2012). Who Mobilizes? An Analysis of Stakeholder Responses to 
Financial Policy Consultations. In S. Pagliari, Making Good Financial Regulation - 
Towards a Policy Response to Regulatory Capture (pp. 85-98). London: International 
Centre for Financial Regulation. 
Rasmussen, A., & Carroll, B. J. (2013). Determinants of Upper-Class Dominance in the 
Heavenly Chorus: Lessons from European Union Online Consultations. British Journal 
of Political Science, 44, 445-459. 
Roemer-Mahler, A. (2013). Business Conlict and Global Politics: The Pharmaceutical Industry 
and the Global Protection of Intellectual Property Rights. Review of International 
Political Economy, 44, 121-152. 
Rourke, F. E. (1984). Bureaucracy, politics, and public policy (3rd Ed.). Boston: Little, Brown. 
Schlozman, K. L. (1984). What Accent the Heavenly Chorus? Political Equality and the 
American Pressure System. Journal of Politics, 46(4), 1006-1032. 
42 
Schmidt, P. (2002). Pursuing Regulatory Relief: Strategic Participation and Litigation in U.S. 
OSHA Rulemaking. Business and Politics, 4(1), 71-89. 
Sharman, J. C. (2011). Testing the Global Financial Transparency Regime. International Studies 
Quarterly, 55, 981-1001. 
Smith, M. (2010). The Mobilization and Influence of Business Interests. In L. Maisel, J. Berry, 
& G. (. Edwards, Oxford Handbook of American Political Parties and Interest Groups. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Smith, M. A. (2000). American Business and Political Power. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Stigler, G. J. (1971). The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science, 2, 3-21. 
Streeck, W. (2014). Buying Time: The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism. Brooklyn: 
Verso. 
Tax Justice Network. (2015). Financial Secrecy Index - 2015 Results. London: Tax Justice 
Network. 
Transparency International. (2016, May 6). US Treasury Issues New Rules on Customer Due 
Diligence, but Gaps Remain and More Action Needed. Retrieved January 27, 2018, from 
Transparency International: 
https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/us_treasury_issues_new_rules_on_custo
mer_due_diligence_but_gaps_remain_and 
Transparency International. (2018). G20 Leaders or Laggards? Reviewing G20 Promises on 
Ending Anonymous Companies. Berlin: Transparency International. 
Truman, D. B. (1951). The Governmental Process, Political Interests and the Public Opinion. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
US Department of the Treasury. (2015). National Money Laundering Risk Assessment 2015. 
Washington: US Department of the Treasury. 
West, W. F. (1984). Structuring administrative discretion: The pursuit of rationality and 
responsiveness. American Journal of Political Science, 28, 340-360. 
Wilson, J. Q. (1989). Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it. New 
York: Basic Books. 
Woll, C. (2013). Lobbying under pressure: the effect of salience on European Union hedge fund 
Regulation. Journal of Common Market Studies, 51(3), 555-572. 
Wright, J. R. (1996). Interest groups and Congress: Lobbying, contributions, and influence. 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
43 
Yackee, J. W., & Yackee, S. W. (2006). A Bias Towards Business? Assessing Interest Group 
Influence on the U.S. Bureaucracy. The Journal of Politics, 68(1), 128-139. 
Yackee, S. (2005). Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: The Influence of Interest Group Comments 
on Federal Agency Rulemaking. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 
103-124. 
Yackee, S. (2006). Assessing Inter-Institutional Attention to and Influence on Governmental 
Regulations. British Journal of Political Science, 723-744. 
Young, K. (2012). Transnational Regulatory Capture? An Empirical Examination of the 
Transnational Lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Review of 
International Political Economy, 19, 663-688. 
Young, K., & Pagliari, S. (2015). Capital United? Business unity in regulatory politics and the 
special place of finance. Regulation & Governance, 11(1), 1-21. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 
Appendix 
Coding Scheme: 2012 Comment Papers  
Risk Basis: When should beneficial ownership information be required?  
 -1: Do not require, or only after account opening on risk basis 
 -0.5: Compliance with current Customer Identification Program requirements suffices 
 0: Collect beneficial ownership information through risk-based approach 
 1: Categorical Requirement for all accounts 
Definition Beneficial Ownership: For whom is the information to be collected? 
-1: Control prong only, remove indirect, minimise number of individuals 
 -0.5: Treat agent as customer, simplify equity interest 
 0: 25% is acceptable, current definition 
 0.5: Lower 25% threshold 
 1: Involves analysis of assets 
Exemptions: To which customers and institutions will this rule not apply? 
-1: Not our FI, 5+ unique exemptions listed, trusts, intermediated accounts 
-0.5: "Low-risk", less than 5 unique exemptions listed 
 0: 25% is acceptable, current definition 
 0.5: Lower 25% threshold 
 1: All financial institutions, no exemptions 
Verification: To what extent is the institution expected to verify beneficial ownership 
information? 
-1: No verification, risk basis only 
-0.5: Reliance on customer, safe harbour 
 0: Identity only 
 0.5: Documentary and non, Look-through requirement 
 1: Verify both identity and status 
Existing Customers: Should beneficial ownership information be requested from existing 
customers? 
-1: No  
 0: On risk basis 
 1: Yes 
 
Coding Scheme: 2014 Comment Papers 
Definition Beneficial Ownership: For whom is the information to be collected? 
-1: Collection on risk-basis, current Customer Identification Program 
-0.5: Certification form only requirement, remove indirect, minimise number/narrow 
definition, no understand nature/purpose 
 0: 25% is adequate, clarify prongs/indirect/nature or purpose 
 0.5: Do not permit nominee, clarify manager, Fallback provision 
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 1: Lower 25%, identify all management under control 
Certification Form: How is the information to be collected? 
-1: Certification form after account opening, remove indirect 
-0.5: Certification form only requirement, agent is customer 
 0: Flexibility in form submission 
 0.5: Governing approval, who can fill in form 
 1: Penalty of perjury 
Verification: To what extent is the institution expected to verify beneficial ownership 
information? 
-1: No verification or only after account is opened 
-0.5: Safe harbour 
 0: Identity only, reliance, risk-based 
 0.5: Documentary and non, Look-through requirement 
 1: Verify both identity and status for all 
Exemptions: To which customers and institutions will this rule not apply? 
-1: 3+ unique exemptions listed, pooled/intermediated accounts, exempt own financial 
institution 
-0.5: "Low-risk", less than 3 unique exemptions listed 
 0: CIP exemptions, trusts, charities, pensions, 1 exemption listed 
 1: All financial institutions, no exemptions, include trusts 
Existing Customers: Should beneficial ownership information be collected from existing 
customers? 
-1: No  
 0: On risk basis 
 1: Yes 
Monitoring/Update: To what extent should monitoring and update of customer records be 
required? 
-1: No fifth pillar, no express requirement 
-0.5: Monitor on risk basis 
 0: No timeframe, monitor and update on risk basis 
 1: Specific requirement for monitoring and updating timeline 
 
Note: While the two codings have slightly different categories, I ensured that there is no overlap 
between categories for accurate comparison. 
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Table 6: Interest Group Comment Issue Areas (In percent) 
Issue Banks Bank 
Associations 
Credit 
Unions 
Credit Union 
Associations 
Business Money 
Services 
Mutual 
Funds/Securities 
Government Civil 
Society 
2012          
Risk Basis 66 54 40 40 25 63 75 33 37 
Definition 
BO 
53 72 - 20 - 45 50 66 50 
Exemptions 80 91 40 50 83 100 50 66 50 
Verification 33 63 -` 20 8 36 - 33 50 
Existing 
Customers 
47 36 20 20 - 18 - 33 50 
Justified 
Only 
13 9 20 30 8 - - 33 25 
Total 
(Count) 
15 11 10 10 12 11 4 3 8 
2014          
Definition 
BO 
20 46 8 81 17 55 45 50 33 
CF Form 60 46 15 45 22 78 54 50 23 
Verification 33 46 8 81 17 44 27 25 41 
Exemptions 53 69 61 64 33 66 89 - 23 
Existing 
Customers 
73 38 38 18 17 44 54 - 36 
Monitoring 53 46 8 45 17 33 45 25 30 
Justified 
Only 
27 31 15 - 50 - 27 25 38 
Total 
(Count) 
15 13 13 11 6 9 11 4 39 
 
